



Bahrain

The Democratic Option & Exclusion Mechanisms

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Bahrain

The democratic option and exclusion mechanisms

Gulf Center for Democratic Development

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Introduction

Bahrain is considered the GCC's vanguard, which began her march to independence by responding to national, political-reform demands through the adoption of an advanced Constitution which was issued in December 1973 in the wake of the formation of a national council with broad regulatory and legislative powers in September 1972. But Parliament collapsed in the face of the first test concerned with the protection of freedoms and the rule of law and Bahrain entered a series of hot and cold confrontations till the late eighties especially after the collapse of the Shah's regime and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran's aspirations for power.

The winds of change and the infiltration of principals

In the light of changes witnessed by the emergence of the new world order after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in concert with the winds of change that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and their impact on the Middle East and the increasing trends towards openness, which affected most of the GCC's political regimes and considering that the issue of governance mechanisms is one of the most controversial issues in relation to serious political reforms, as it is frequently considered to be behind many of the social and economic problems, the democratization process in the face of the prevailing trend of tyranny in systems of governance received the most attention. Consequently, the opposition's sharpness and influence in society increased and the several ruling circles were forced to seriously consider political reforms in the face of popular demands especially with worsening economic crises. Bahrain was not far from the effects of such hot winds and so the state took several steps towards openness the most important of which was the establishment of the Shura Council in December 1992. And His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's ascend to the throne in March 1999 was a major turning point in favor of democracy in the entire GCC. Indeed, it opened up the prospects of working for social justice in the region and it made a noticeable change in the map of political forces where the phenomenon of clandestine organizations and structures that operate outside legitimacy and the rule of law were eliminated.

The reform project also opened phased, democratic transformation development opportunities involving all political forces and their operation within the framework of the political association law which was passed in September 2005. This process caused a qualitative transformation in the interactions that govern the relationship between civil society and the state since the collapse of the National Council's experience in 1975. All this happened against the backdrop of unprecedented consensus between the state and the various political forces under the umbrella of the political principles which were framed in the National Action Charter, which was put to a milestone referendum in February 2001 which had moral and political effects that surpassed Bahrain and reflected positively on neighboring countries and the Pacific. This happened after overcoming the effects of the chronic crisis that dominated the relationship between civil society and the state after elimination of the effects of the experience of the National Council's collapse in 1975.

The constitutional amendments in May 2002 were the first barrier that expedited the creation of a new political division through which a new political map was formed within 3 circles: loyalty and following the footsteps of government programs, rejectionist forces from within the reform project and the forces of open opposition. But the salient feature of this new division, in addition to regional and international

influences, was that the Islamic movement, both Sunni and Shi'a become dominant in the political arena, directing events and effecting popular, political participation.

Since 1999, the general situation in Bahrain has been characterized by a high degree of stability, despite what has been and continues to be witnessed in the country of scattered, seasonal violence and protests from time to time. But what increases the complexity of the situation are continued restrictions on intellectual currents and the spectrum of political action to work within the scope of the concept of "associations" and not "parties" which reflect societal interests and defend known rights, which undermines the process of political participation and the continued situation of an ongoing crisis in the nature of the relationship between the major political currents in society and the state. This is in addition to the continuing weakness in the state apparatus and its failure to renew the ruling elite in favor of the reform project and the departure of economic development from the strategic oversight of the executive power in light of faulty demographics, the increasing influence of U.S. interests in Bahrain and the implications of the situation in neighboring countries and those of the Pacific on the scene in Bahrain.

Regional and international pressure on the Kingdom of Bahrain to continue the reform march or regression can not be a substitute for positive pressure that can be practiced by people of the homeland themselves to achieve the full goals of the reform project as expressed in the National Action Charter. And this is linked to a clear fact which is that these democratic developments are associated with the development of the real political organizations of civil society and not the fragile, false ones manufactured by some elements in the state or the security services in order to control the paths of civil society and voiding it of its content. Real organizations are the ones that contribute to increasing the sense of citizens, mobilize them, formulate alternative programs, urge the state to honor its promises and deny her support when it retracts, and, thereby, deepen the firmness of the mechanisms of democratic work in society and support the foundations of stability and social peace.

The stumbling of the newborn experiment

Bahrain lives since mid 2004 in a climate dominated by an organized and increasingly polarized state of sectarian mobilization which clearly reflected on political life. And perhaps, the serious report published by the "International Crisis Group" in May 2005 on the situation in Bahrain and its entanglement with the eastern region of Saudi Arabia addressed in a subsequent report issued in September 2005, was the first institutionalized attempt to anticipate the risks and consequences of the phenomenon as it confirms her as a society divided along sectarian lines under the control of the Sunni community and clear, racist policy against the Shi'a majority. The report also pointed to the increasing signs of social, sectarian screening to determine the features of the political sectarianism in all of the issues raised. Bahrain seems to be heading, as it appears, in the medium and long term, to reproduce the Lebanese scene in terms of consecrating the sectarian situation and establishing screening mechanisms that may lead to each sect having, in a more obvious way than what is prevailing now, their exclusive residential areas, parties, economic, religious, health, social, artistic, educational institutions and their courts, media, press, radio and television, etc.

The picture gets darker as a state of continuous suffering and disappointment in the ability of the reform project to help break the historical impasse prevails. Bahrain moves towards the 2006 elections with increasing evidence of an escalation in the state of intense sectarian polarization between the two main blocs, Sunni and Shi'a (the harvest of the previous parliament + 2007-2008 budget approval + electronic

voting + cancellation of the Youth Parliament + elections merging and continued non-announcement of its schedule + delay in the release of the Financial Audit report + naturalization, etc.). And the main question became not who is the political direction or electoral program that will win the election, but who is the winning sect in the next municipal and parliamentary elections? Who is the minority sect and who is the majority?

The risks faced by the democratization project in Bahrain are still limited in that it failed to maintain national consensus on key issues despite the overwhelming support for the National Action Charter. And some circles continue to believe that the essence of the crisis is the dilemma of non-confidence in the intentions of the ruling elite considering the entire reform process as just a grant which emerged from an upper initiative controlled in its output and future development by unknown circles despite domestic, regional and international interactions in favor of democracy and social justice.

On the other hand, the conviction is widening that opportunities to establish the foundations of democratic transformation are primarily related to the extent civil society and its active forces contribute in supporting its directions and qualifying positive opportunities in favor of commitment to the National Action Charter on the direct and long-term levels. But the biggest challenge for the Bahraini democratic transformation project is its ability to handle and interact with the derivatives of the outcome of achievements and failures of the first legislative term (2002-2006). The balance is weighed towards confirming the lack of an appropriate constitutional, legal climate to move the democratization process, especially in the absence of separation and balance between the five authorities in Bahrain (the executive, judicial, legislative, media and civil society) and the clear increase in the dominance of the executive power and its powers over the inputs and outputs of the democratic process and mechanisms of legislation and oversight.

Transformational shifts towards democracy in the experiences of other countries (Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America), and to pump healthy, renewable blood into the political system, based itself on the reestablishment of the relationship with the rule of law and the restoration of the link between the regime's democratic content and the existence of a hierarchical, legal system that goes beyond any abstract legal form which does not contain democratic standards or guarantees for the protection of fundamental freedoms. The most notable example here is the de-linking between the political establishment which rule is conducted through - regardless of its form or name - and the state considering it is a deep and fundamental shift in the nature of the state.

The limits of change in the political system

Democracy is a complex process and each experience has its own specificity that makes it distinct from other experiences. It is a set of values which are based on an interdependent system of public rights' guarantees, fundamental freedoms, citizenship, tolerance, the rule of law and a clear separation of powers. And without a doubt, free and fair elections are the main touchstone to test the strength and reality of change and whether it is just a cosmetic, apparent change or not. Hence, we can not ignore the significant role played by financials in influencing the political process in any state, not to mention its amplified role in the case of Bahrain, which, without a doubt, is revealing of the reality of the democratic process progress, the nature of the forces that control the country and the ability of small, active, organized groups to gain a great deal of influence through controlling the paths of the electoral process by financing loyal candidates, and, thus, have a tight grip on political and economic decision-making centers.

Fair elections is a partnership in decision-making and vice versa for it is a test for the government's serious intentions in democratic reform and the reform path's real status and not merely a mechanism to achieve democracy and not, also, an end in themselves. As such, any systematic fraud in it is a justification for the continuation of tyranny, domination and public endorsement of the legitimacy of violence, insurgency and terrorism. For whatever manipulation is taking place, regardless of form or source, proves that the general features of the regime have not changed: an executive system that holds all aspects of society and a determination to limit political competition into its lowest levels using the claim that the state is going through a transitory phase, which justifies strong control of all aspects of life under the guise of a formal democratic process. This is a confirmation that is not open to interpretation that, without doubt, the minority wants change, but it wants it according to its own view which it wants to impose without consensus or respect for the will of the popular majority.

The main challenge

The future of the reform project is linked to mechanisms of renewing the blood of the political elite and the development of the bases it stands upon in ways that allow pluralism and opens opportunities for the development of the democratization process in safe and healthy ways. Therefore, the attempt to control the composition of the political elite and dominate its direction and choices in accordance with a vision outside the framework of legal and constitutional legitimacy is considered a serious threat to the entire reform project of His Majesty the King and leads into a dark tunnel. The group that is exposed by this report has employed the project's mechanisms and groups of people associated with it (all Sunni, mostly sympathetic with a specific political direction and its overwhelming majority belongs to a single ethnic group) to the point where it has presented institutionalized divisions rather than overcoming them.

This is a direction which not only aims to falsify the results of political practice, but, also, aims to destabilize, confuse and weaken the opportunities for political participation and its representative institutions (municipal, parliamentary), is, without doubt, a matter that weakens the degree of political competitiveness which gives pluralism real content and, indirectly, serves to destroy opportunities for differentiation in the attitudes and visions and deforms the diversity of political identity and destroys chances of legitimate differences in approach, which are all close qualities of the pluralism concept.

Why are we presenting this information?

The Gulf Center for Democratic Development presents this report, which reveals features of a strategy which aims to control the outcomes of the renewal of the regime's legitimacy for the second legislative term (2006 - 2010) by employing the municipal council and parliamentary elections through controlling the way by which members are elected and the quality of their representation in a clear violation of legality and the rule of law, and through the creation of a center of "forces" operating outside the scope of legitimacy and transparency process. And, thus, the road is cut off for the participation of citizens voting freely for their representatives and, consequently, depriving them from participation in national decision-making and converting political opposition into an oppositional "formality" and locking chances of the devolution of executive power and even preventing critical examination of the causes that lead to the occurrence of failures which leads to the erosion of constitutional legitimacy.

A quick review of the network's product and its participation and interaction with Bahrain's realities up until August 2006 determines that the immediate objectives of the strategy that it pursued are:

First: curtail the role of opposition forces in the legislative institution and the future of political life, weaken its resolve in civil society and the media and drive it away from the circles of influence in the institutions of the executive branch through moving and directing the Sunni street in a pre-calculated way to face what it portrays as a "Shi'a dominance."

Second: ensuring the appropriate environment to gain a majority pro-executive authority in the composition of the legislature (2006 -2010) while maintaining a high rate of participation in the 2006 elections and taking care to create an atmosphere of credibility before regional and international public opinion.

Third: to create a climate for raising the degree of coordination between the executive bodies and the alternative civil society institutions to serve the goals mentioned above.

The adventure is a bold attempt to pre-empt the pillars of the reform project from the inside and an attempt to void the National Action Charter of its content and seems, through available evidence, to have been planned by someone who carried its project and supervised the construction of its regulatory network during the past period on the backburner.

Seriousness of the matter is multiplied if we consider who the leader of this network is?

The network



Who is Sheikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa?

Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs controlling the joints of the executive branch since September 2005

The head of the Central Informatics Organization (ranks as minister). The organization evolved from the Central Bureau of Statistics, which was founded in May 1983, following a split from the Ministry of Finance. The organization manages the government's information network and implements strategic information systems security in the Kingdom of Bahrain, the General Directorate of Identity and Population Registry, the General Directorate of Statistics and the Higher Committee for Elections.

The direct supervisor of the Civil Services Bureau since March 2006 and controls the fate of the state apparatus and the fate of nearly 40 thousand of its employees.

The chairman of the executive committee overseeing the 2006 election which he formed in March 2006 without consulting any party and is, therefore, a member of the Higher Committee for Elections, which is planned through his office.

Sheikh Ahmed was born in 1966 and graduated in 1988 from the University of Salford with a specialty in mathematics and computer science and is considered one of the fastest career-ladder climbers in the history of Bahrain, he was director of the General Directorate of Statistics in 2000 and acting head of the Central Informatics Organization since April 2004 - after the appointment of his brother, Sheikh Mohammed, as head of the Royal Court - without a formal decision until his appointment as Minister in September 2005.

Married 4 times and has five sons and three daughters.

Without doubt, the underground network, which has been active for quite some time - 24 months at least - and has hundreds of thousands of Dinars, if not millions, is working to go back to square one which witnessed the collision between the different political forces and the state, the escalation of violence and terrorism and the rule of the state security apparatus. This network created counter formations linked to and overlapping with the state apparatus and exploiting its resources by employing them to serve political purposes outside the framework of constitutional legitimacy. Through this illegal network, an attempt is embodied to override the legal legitimacy, falsify popular will and vilify civil organizations - through a false "network" reminiscent of the mechanisms which caused the collapse of the 1973 experience in terms of attempting to jump over society's reality and its relationship to the state. The illegal network further seeks to impose the will of a hidden minority without known affiliations and interests over that of the majority, which paves to the collapse of the reform project's experience. The network is clearly attempting to undermine democratic legitimacy and override the principles set by the National Action Charter and expressed through the Constitution's articles.

Opportunities and risks

With this report, we aim to make the experience of democratic transition in the Kingdom of Bahrain a role model and an element of attraction and democratic inspiration for the peoples and rulers of the peoples of the neighboring and Pacific States. And we present here preliminary information on the organizational form of this outlaw "network" to all parties of the political movement in Bahrain and to the state represented by its highest apparatus in order to expose this secret plan and cleanse the democratic transformation experience from the works of secret organizations, regardless of their source, which override the legal and constitutional legitimacy.

Recommendations

We believe that the first step is for the High Commissioner of the Kingdom of Bahrain and the political movement with all the colors of its spectrum to deal with this report with the utmost seriousness and rigor so that the Bahraini project of democratic transformation may regain its health and we recommend a number of steps for this treatment:


- Establishment of an inquiry commission into the facts to identify the responsible parties and those that provided funds, moral and political support and protected the network's structure during the previous period.
- Take a clear stand from the individuals and institutions behind the network, the nature of their role as we approach the 2006 elections scheduled in November.
- Handle the facts of the network with the highest organ of state represented by the person of His Majesty the King, the symbol of sovereignty, legitimacy and the rule of law.

The facts

As specified in the following pages through the graphic chart and accompanying documentation.

Leadership ring

Network field command (Champions) consists of 5 people reporting directly to Sheikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa and they, respectively, are:

	Dr. Raed Muhammad Abdullah Al Shams
	<p>Alongside his salary and known benefits, receives a monthly stipend of BD 1,200.</p> <p>The right hand of Sheikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa in the network's management. Does not hide his sympathy with the Reform Society and its political arm, the Islamic Platform.</p> <p>Director of the General Directorate of Statistics at the Central Informatics Organization and was appointed in April 2006 as assistant to the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers of Human, Financial Resources and Services with a rank of Assistant Deputy Minister and he is a member of the 2006 election Executive Committee.</p> <p>He directly supervises the group of Jordanian intelligence responsible for monitoring the political situation, coordinating and supervising the work of the network's grassroots organizations (Legal Activists + Bahrain First + Monitoring of Human Rights + The Political Bahrain), supervising the administrative and technical support group, securing official communications and the distribution of financial allocations.</p>



Muhammad Ali Muhammad Al-Qa'ed

Alongside his salary and known benefits, receives a monthly stipend of BD 1,200.

The left hand of Sheikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa. He is well known for his association with the Reform Society and its political arm, the Islamic Platform.

Director of the Directorate of Information Systems and was promoted in April 2006 as General Director of the General Directorate of Information Technology ranking as an Assistant Deputy Minister

He is Vice President of the 2006 elections' Executive Committee.

He supervises the group overseeing electronic voting and the various technical work groups.

	Jamal Yousif Muhammad Al-Asiri
	Alongside his salary and known benefits, receives a monthly stipend of BD 800.
<p>Former editor of the Reform Magazine (Brotherhood's Reform Society) and former BBC correspondent and media affairs adviser to the Head of the Royal Court, Sheikh Mohammed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa.</p> <p>And the current acting editor of Al Watan newspaper.</p> <p>Prepares media and news articles, oversees the media group and works as an adviser to Al Watan.</p>	



Adel Rashid Bu Saib'

Alongside his salary and known benefits, receives a monthly stipend of BD 1,000.

Works as an employee of the Central Informatics Organization and is fully dedicated to the activities of the Muslim Educational Society, which falls under the Al Isalah Islamic Society, as the director of its social affairs and projects.

He supervises the group's work which aims to activate and mobilize the Sunni community against the Shi'a community.

	Nasser Muhammad Yousif Laurie
	<p>Alongside his salary and known benefits, receives a monthly stipend of BD 1,000.</p>
<p>Former employee of the Central Informatics Organization working since 2004 as Assistant Deputy of Coordination and Follow-up at the office of the Head of the Royal Court, Sheikh Mohammed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa, and has tight relations with Salafi currents in Bahrain and Gulf countries.</p> <p>Supervisor of the Al Watan newspaper's project and a member of its board of directors and, nominally, holds 10% of its shares.</p> <p>Some indicators point to his link to the Naturalization commission at the Royal Court.</p>	

Total monthly rewards of the Leadership Ring = BD 5,200

Groups

The management and coordination of each group is done separately and coordination between groups is done through group supervisors.

Administrative & Technical Support Group

Most of them work in the Central Informatics Organization

Name	Monthly stipend (BD)	Place of work
Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah	500	Assistant Secretary General of the Council of Ministers (ranks as Assistant Deputy Minister)
Maher Al-Khan	500	Central Informatics Organization
Yousif Al-Bin Khalil	500	Al-Watan newspaper
Ahmad Bu Haza'a	500	
Yousif Abdallah Yousif	250	Benefit company
Yousif Al Bader	250	Central Informatics Organization and the processing of his appointment by the Council of Ministers' affairs has not been completed.
Khalid Ahmad	250	Central Informatics Organization
Dr. Nabeel Shams	500	Central Informatics Organization
Maysoon Al-Qais	150	Central Informatics Organization
Rashid Muslim Rashid	500	Central Informatics Organization
Nasser Al-Amadi	750	Chief, Minister's Office, Civil Service Bureau
Hala a'sheer	250	Central Informatics Organization
Hussain Ali Al-Mutawa	300	Private Driver
Hamad Al-Mehezze	500	Central Informatics Organization
Ahmad Khairi	400	Accountant
Ali Saqer	150	Driver
Fahad Bin Al Abdaziz	500	Public Opinion Center
Abdallah Bu Subeea	250	Driver
Dr. Zakarya Al-Khajah	250	Information Technology
Tariq Al-Sendi	250	Information Technology
Khalid Al-Hedan	500	Printing maps of electoral districts
Total monthly allocations	8,000	

Returnees Project

Khalifa Bin Muhammad Bin Abdulwahab	800	
Dr. Aymen Jumaa	250	
Ahmad Khairy	150	
Adel Haji	800	
Total monthly allocations	2,000	

The Jordanian Intelligence Group

Collect and analyze information about the activities of the political movement with particular emphasis on Shi'a organizations.

The group consists of 4 individuals who have been brought in from Jordan to Bahrain in September 2005 and were hosted, for a month, at the Hilton Hotel while an office on the top floor of the Director of Central Informatics Organization's office building in Juffair and later moved to an office in the Diplomatic Area.

The total monthly allocations are received by Dr. Raed Shams on their behalf.

Details of their monthly allowances are as follows:

Name	Monthly stipend (BD)
Omar Al-Radad, Lieutenant Colonel	2,056
Ali Ishaqat, Lieutenant Colonel	1,956
Hussain Al-Sarhan, Lieutenant Colonel	1,956
Sami Al-Madan, Captain	1,616
Total monthly allocations	7,584

The Sectarian Switch Group

Coordinate protest ads in newspapers and streets, mosque sermons, a Sunni-zation and Shi'a community penetration project and care for its members.

Supervised by Adel Bu Saiba, each of them receives a monthly stipend of:

Name	Monthly stipend (BD)
Shareef Adnan	200
Ismael Ibrahim	200
Baker Al-Yameni	400
Ahmad Ali Rashid	200
Bu Khadeja	200
Total monthly allocations	1,200

See the Sunni Strategic Plan

The Electronic Group



The group's field supervisor is Nizar Maroof Omar

Works for the Bass company at the Bahrain Airport and. Formalities are underway to appoint him Director of Information Technology at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs

Monthly stipend of BD 400 dinars

Most members work at the Central Informatics Organization

Electronic Voting

Name		Monthly stipend (BD)
Salah Khalifa Al Bin Jassim	Director, Information Systems, CP Court	400
Mahmood Hamad Al Mansoori	Director, Office of the Commander	200
Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad Al Mahmoodi	Director, Population Registry	500
Muhammad Rashid Al Manaee	Former Director, Elections Department	1,000
Aref Muhammad Abdalrahman Bu Ali	Central Informatics Organization	250
Adel Abdallah Al Sayed	?	250
Yasser Yacoub Al Qotti	?	250
Akram Zaki Taha	Central Informatics Organization	250
Mubarak Al Hedi	Central Informatics Organization	300
Ahmad Abo Al Fateh	Central Informatics Organization	300
Fahad Abdalhakeem Al Shafeae	Central Informatics Organization	300
Ali Muhammad Ali Al Betti	?	100
Yousif Al Betti	?	100
Khaled Ibrahim Darwesh	?	650
Ibrahim Yousif Hassan Bu Zabon	?	200
Ameena Ibrahim Al Ahmad	Central Informatics Organization	600
Amal Ibrahim	?	200
Osama Al Kuheji	?	900
Total monthly allocations		6,750

Bahrain Forum

Adel Ali Abdallah	1,000
Khalifa Bin Arabi	900
Abdalrahman Mohi Al Deen	450
Dr. Farooq Al Munaiseer	500
Khalid Essa Al Eid	500
Abdallah Al Qarawi	300
Yousif Al Mutaz	250
Bader Shaheen Al Thawadi	200
Total monthly allocations	4,100

SMS Group

The approximate BD 150 monthly amount for SMS messages is secured outside of Bahrain.

Attached document proves that the Celerity Systems company in Cape Town, South Africa is the service provider.

The Egyptian Media Group



Field supervisor is Ali Radi Hassanein who works as a journalist at the Royal Court

Conducts its operations out of two offices (East Riffa, Zinj Al-Jadeeda) which were established at the cost of BD 12,000 (Twelve thousand Dinars). The group works on monitoring Shi'a internet forums and participating using false names, preparation of counter information and propaganda materials to be published, mainly, through Al-Watan newspaper while some is distributed to columnists in daily newspapers to re-phrase and publish in their names. Work coordination is conducted through Jamal Al-Asiri.

Electronic Voting

Name		Monthly stipend (BD)
Ali Radi Hassanein	Royal Court	250
Sami Kamal Dawood	Manager of Al-Ahram office and also works in Al-Watan	1500
Ahmad Nabawi	Have work contracts with Foreign Media, Ministry of Information	250
Abdallah Muhammad Abdallah		250
Hatim Abdaldaim		250
Ahmad Abdalmonem	Recently joined the Central Informatics Organization	500
Hassan Hafni	Public Opinion Center	250
Essa Al Muraghi		550
Total monthly allocations		3,800

Technical & Administrative Support

Abdalkareem Al Mulla	100
Nawaf Al Mulla	30
Waleed Al Musamim	150
Ruba Shahir Al Majali	500
Manal Faisal Al Thunian	500
Fadi Akoom	1,000
Nasser Al Majali	3,000
Muhammad Al Mahmeed	1,000
Muhammad Ahmad Al Banki	1,000
Dr. Nazar Muhammad Saeed Al Ani	3,000
Total monthly allocations	10,280

Sagitha & Sanitha Campaign

The girls were brought from India in June 2005 under the campaign of "Two Indian, orphan victims of the 90s' terrorism visit Bahrain."


The campaign coordination was supervised by an Indian journalist at Gulf Daily News by the name Soman Baby.

Tickets and accommodation = 1,500

Soman Baby bonus = 1,000

Ahmad Al Nazeri bonus = 350

Total cost of the campaign in BD 2,850

	Pubic Opinion Center for Media Projects
Yaqub Al Asiri	Apartment 21, Road 715, Complex 207, Muharraq
<p>The objective of the centre is the realization of indicators and impact on public opinion trends.</p> <p>Was founded, in May 2005, as a private company posing as a press office and a house to gauge public opinion. The company, capital of BD 20,000 (twenty thousand Dinars), was an equal partnership between Hisham Abdulrahman Jaffer (Chairman of the Board of Directors of Al-Watan) and Jacob Yousif Muhammad Al-Asiri (brother of Jamal Al-Asiri).</p> <p>All operations are funded with a monthly average of BD 3,000 (three thousand Dinars) which gradually rose to 5,000 (five thousand Dinars) per month.</p> <p>Signed an exclusive collaboration agreement in March 2006 with Al-Watan newspaper and produced a number of polls most of which were published Al-Watan.</p>	



First issue was published on December 11, 2005

The Al-Watan company for publishing and printing was formed in October 2004 and officially registered in May 2005 with a capital of BD 1 million by five persons:

- Engineer Hisham Abdulrahman Muhammad Jaafar Bucheery (60% of stock, Chairman of the Board of Directors)
- Sheikh Muhammad Ali Muhammad Al Khalifa (10%, a businessman)
- Isa Ali Isa Al-Dosari (10%, Deputy Head of the Al-Dawaser tribe in Dammam and Bahrain)
- Nasser Muhammad Yousuf Laurie (10%, staff at the Royal Court)
- Dr. Mansoor Muhammad Jamil Al-'Arayyed (10%, member of the Shura Council)

The Board of Directors never met since its inception, not even once, and there are also allegations that the Board of Directors is a sham and none of the members pay a single penny for the newspaper since its inception till now.

Funding is done through the transfer of amounts from the account of Kuwait Finance House to a middle account in Bahrain Shamil Bank No. 501-200983-001 in the name of Nasser Muhammad Yousif Laurie and from there to Al-Watan's accounts. The estimated publishing monthly costs are BD 100,000 (one hundred thousand Dinars).

Became the only newspaper that the staff of the Royal Court could buy stock in [Jamal Al-Asiri + Muhammad Naji Al-Amayreh (Jordan) + Ali Radhi Hassanein (Egypt) + Muhammad Nassar (Egypt)]



Who is Hisham Abdulrahman Muhammad Jafar Bu Jerri?

Due to the fact the he works in real estate, higher education and the media, some call him "Hisham al-Hariri" because he enjoys the name and would like to think that he is walking in the footsteps of the late Lebanese president, Rafik al-Hariri, on the way to becoming the next Prime Minister of Bahrain!



He is a schoolmate and personal friend of Sheikh Ahmed bin Ateyatalla Al Khalifa to whom he is bound by business relationships perhaps the most notable of which is the famous "Umm Al Hassam Building Deal" estimated at BD 3 million (the deal prompted the First Deputy Chairman of the Shura Council, Abdulrahman Jamsheer, to inquire in parliament if favoritism or exceptions were being made in issuing building permits in mid-December 2005).


He also oversees the Sheikh Ahmed new residential tower "Al-Wasmyya" project consisting of 35 stories in the Diplomatic Area, Manama.

Born in July 1966. Founded a company, HAJ, in May 1994 specializing in Quantity Surveying and project management in the field of real estate construction. Expanded later in 1997 into steelworks and fabrication and is currently overseeing a number of projects most famous of which are Durrat Al-Bahrain and the Bahrain World Trade International Center and is preparing to establish a city along the lines of the Financial Harbor which is located between the bridges of Sheikh Isa and Shaikh Hamad, and the Diyar Al Muharraq project. In November 2002, he founded the company from which emerged the Royal University for Girls.

Civil Organizations

Working in an integrated manner to adopt files prepared in advance and political campaigns that correspond with positions counter to the issues raised by the political societies and political movement in Bahrain. All expenses are paid through organizational representatives. Organizational accounting numbers have fluctuated according to activities conducted and the status of the general political climate in Bahrain.

<p>Jurists Society</p>	 <p>Yousif Essa Al Hashimi</p> <p>(Advocates and Legal Advice, Office 25, Sheikh Duaij Building, Government Avenue, Manama)</p> <p>Monthly stipend of BD 1,000</p> <p>Editor and lawyer for Al-Watan newspaper.</p> <p>Member of the Board of Directors of the Institute of Political Development</p> <p>Candidate for Shura Council membership (2006-2010)</p>	<p>Al-Watan newspaper held her first general assembly meeting on April 3, 2006 and has well established offices in Umm Al Hassam (Villa 848, Road 5133, Complex 333).</p> <p>Her Board of Directors is made up of:</p> <p>Yousif Al Hashemi (President)</p> <p>Massouma Abdul Rasoul (Adviser to the Legal Department of the Council of Ministers)</p> <p>Nawaf Mohamed El-Sayed Khaled Abdullah Al Shammari Muhammad Kazem Abdullah Majed Muhammad Magdm Abdul Rahman Al-Ghoneim (Secretary)</p> <p>In spite of the fact that all costs were paid in full, Yousif Al Hashemi claimed that "all expenses spent on headquarters, assets, furniture and founding fees are a personal donation."</p> <p>Monthly headquarters rent = BD 600 Guard = BD 150 Founding Fees BD 4,087 Average monthly expenses = BD 1,000</p>
<p>Bahrain First</p>	 <p>Muhammad Said Al Muran</p> <p>Monthly stipend of BD 500</p>	<p>Its activities accelerated since April 2005 in the face of popular demonstrations organized by the alliance of four.</p> <p>Monthly costs are estimated at BD 200</p>

<p>Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society</p>	 <p>Faisal Hassan Fulad</p> <p>Shura Council Member</p> <p>Monthly stipend of BD 500</p> <p>Candidate for Shura Council membership (2006-2010)</p>	<p>Was established in November 30, 2004.</p> <p>Her Board of Directors consists of:</p> <p>Houda Ezra Ebrahim Nonoo Secretary General</p> <p>Tariq Jalil Mohammed Al-Saffar Deputy Secretary General</p> <p>candidate for Shura Council membership (2006-2010), his company implemented the new identity of the Directorate of Election and Referendum for BD 100,000 (one hundred thousand)</p> <p>Omar Almardhi Legal Advisor</p> <p>Hala Ramzi Fayez Women, Child and Minorities Rights</p> <p>Faisal Hassan Fulad Regional and International Director</p> <p>Average monthly expenses = BD 1,300</p>	
<p>Bahrain Political Society</p>	<p>Jaber Sultan Al Suwaidi</p> <p>Monthly stipend of BD 500</p> <p>Received in July 2006 a sum of BD 8,000 consisting of an advance of BD 3,000 to spend on Jassim al-Saidi's campaign + an advance of BD 2,000 to spend on Khamis Al Rumaihi's campaign + BD 3,000 to establish the society's building in Riffa</p> <p>Support has also been provided for the candidate Jamal Dawood Salman in the form of BD 1,200 to set up a tent in his courtyard for guests + BD 1,000 for a soccer tournament and a cultural competition.</p> <p>Delivery of an advance of BD 2,000 to Salah Jalahma to spend on elections.</p> <p>Jamal Asiri BD 3,000 to prepare printed materials for the election campaign.</p> <p>Adnan Abdul Rahman Mohammed Bucheery received BD 10,000 to spend on supporting candidates (Ahlul Jama'a and Ahlul Bait)</p> <p>The focus will be to support all candidates who will compete with Wifaq and in particular members of the House of Representatives in the first quarter.</p>	<p>Establishment is ongoing using members from Central Informatics Organization and the three societies (BHRW + Jurists + Bahrain First)</p> <p>Headquarters have been rented and established in East Riffa and supplied with a Xerox Printer worth BD 7,000 etc.</p>	

Funding

We outline here the total estimated expenditure on the network. Without doubt, an audit of the network's account # 011010010468 at the Kuwait Finance House at the bank's headquarter in Manama, which is overseen by the employee, Khaled Fakhro, will give an accurate picture of total sums disbursed during the past 24 months.

Leadership Ring	5,200	5,200
Groups		
Dr. Raed Shams Group		
Administrative and technical support	8,000	
Returnees Project	2,000	
Jordanian Intelligence	7,584	17,584
Adel Bu Sbeea Group		
Sectarian Switch	3,200	3,200
Muhammad Al Qaed Group		
Electronic	7,150	
Bahrain Forums	3,900	
SMS	150	11,200
Jamal Al Aseri Group		
Egyptian media	4,050	
Public Opinion Center	5,000	
Technical and administrative support	10,280	19,330
Nasser Lori Group		
Al Watan News Paper	100,000	100,000
Associations		
Jurists Society	2,000	Founding 6,000
Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society	1,800	Founding 5,000
Bahrain First Society	700	
Bahrain Political Society	3,000	Founding 16,000
Electoral support		25,000
Campaign of the Indians Sagitha and Sanitha		2,850

Monthly direct expenditure is approximately equivalent to BD 165,000 - that's without adding founding expenses which amount to BD 27,000 or the financial support for loyal candidates, which reached at the end of July about BD 25,000.

We estimate that the total amount for this operation has exceeded BD 2 Million by the end of August 2006.

The fundamental question here is: who is providing this generous financial support? And for whose benefit?